BPI vs. IAC, 206 SCRA 408, February 21, 1992

(Bank; Negligence; Meticulous Care in treatment of accounts)

Facts: When the respondent spouses opened their joint current account, the “new accounts” teller of the bank by mistake, placed the old existing separate personal account number of Arthur Canlas on the deposit slip for the new joint checking account of the spouses so that the initial deposit for the joint checking account was miscredited to Arthur’s personal account .

Because of this, one of the checks issued by one of the spouse was dishonoured for insufficient funds prompting private respondents to file a complaint for damages against petitioner bank. Petitioner bank argues that it is not considered negligent and liable for damages on account of the inadvertence of its bank employee considered that it was an honest mistake and not tainted with malice and bad faith.

Issue: WON the petitioner bank was guilty of gross negligence in the handling of private respondents’ bank account.

Held: There is no merit in petitioner’s argument that it should not be considered negligent, much less held liable for damages on account of the inadvertence of its bank employee for Article 1173 of the Civil Code only requires it to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family.

As a business affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship (Simex vs CA, 183 SCRA 360).

Navarro vs. Escobido, GR 153788, November 27, 2009

(Provisional Remedies: Replevin: Prior demand is not a condition precedent)

Facts: Private respondent (Karen Go) files a complaint with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of replevin against petitioner (Navarro) for the seizure of 2 motor vehicles under lease agreement. Petitioner maintains among others in the case at bar that the complaints were premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.

Issue: WON prior demand is a condition precedent to an action for  a writ of replevin.

Held: No. Petitioner erred in arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is filed since we cannot liken a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.

For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:

Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond.

The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who personally knows the facts:

(a)      That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;

(b)      That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief;

(c)      That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary attachment, or otherwise placed under custodialegis, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure or custody; and

(d) The actual market value of the property.

The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant in the action.

The SC held that there is nothing in the afore-quoted provision which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.

 

Rivera vs. Vargas, GR 165895, June 5, 2009

(Procedural Remedies: Improper service of writ of replevin)

 

Facts: Petitioner avers that the writ of replevin was served upon and signed by the security guard on duty where the rock-crushing plant to be seized was located contrary to the sheriff’s return stating that both the writ and the summons was served upon petitioner. Nine (9) days after the writ was served on the security guard, petitioner filed an answer to the complaint accompanied by a prayer for the approval of her redelivery bond. The RTC, however, denied the redelivery bond for having been filed beyond the five-day mandatory period prescribed in Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 60.

 

Petitioner argues in the case at bar via the petition on Rule 45 that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying her counterbond on the ground that it was filed out of time. She contends that the mandatory five-day period did not even begin to run in this case due to the improper service of the writ of replevin, contrary to Section 4 of Rule 60.

 

Issue: WON the denial of counterbond filed beyond the 5 day mandatory period is erroneous considering the writ was improperly served.

 

Held: Yes.

Before a final judgment, property cannot be seized unless by virtue of some provision of law. The Rules of Court, under Rule 60, authorizes such seizure in cases of replevin. However, a person seeking a remedy in an action for replevin must follow the course laid down in the statute, since the remedy is penal in nature. When no attempt is made to comply with the provisions of the law relating to seizure in this kind of action, the writ or order allowing the seizure is erroneous and may be set aside on motion by the adverse party.

 

The process regarding the execution of the writ of replevin in Section 4 of Rule 60 is unambiguous: the sheriff, upon receipt of the writ of replevin and prior to the taking of the property, must serve a copy thereof to the adverse party (petitioner, in this case) together with the application, the affidavit of merit, and the replevin bond. The reasons are simple, i.e., to provide proper notice to the adverse party that his property is being seized in accordance with the court’s order upon application by the other party, and ultimately to allow the adverse party to take the proper remedy consequent thereto.

 

Service of the writ upon the adverse party is mandatory in line with the constitutional guaranty on procedural due process and as safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.

 

In the case at bar since the writ was invalidly served, petitioner is correct in contending that there is no reckoning point from which the mandatory five-day period shall commence to run.

 

The writ must satisfy proper service in order to be valid and effective: i.e. it should be directed to the officer who is authorized to serve it; and it should be served upon the person who not only has the possession or custody of the property involved but who is also a party or agent of a party to the action. Consequently, a trial court is deemed to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction with respect to the ancillary action of replevin if it seizes and detains a personalty on the basis of a writ that was improperly served, such as what happened in this case.

 

Petitioner’s proper remedy should have been to file a motion to quash the writ of replevin or a motion to vacate the order of seizure. Nevertheless, petitioner’s filing of an application for a redelivery bond, while not necessary, did not thereby waive her right to question the improper service.

 

The trial for the main action shall continue. Respondent may, however, file a new application for replevin should he choose to do so.

 

Tijing vs. CA, 354 SCRA 17; GR No. 125901, March 8, 2001

(Special Proceedings – Habeas Adoption: Custody of a minor)

Facts: Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their son from respondent and presented witnesses to substantiate their petition. Respondent claimed on the other hand that she is the natural mother of the child.

The trial court held in favor of the petitioners and granted the petition for habeas corpus. On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the trial court. The appellate court expressed its doubts on the propriety of the habeas corpus.

Issue: WON habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of a minor.

Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will.

Moncupa vs. Enrile , No. L-63345, January 30, 1986

(Special Proceedings – Temporary release with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic)

Facts: Petitioners were arrested and detained on the allegation that they were members of a subversive organization. Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss after the petitioner was temporarily released from detention on the ground that the petition for habeas corpus may be deemed moot and academic since the petitioner is free and no longer under the respondent’s custody.

Petitioner argues that his temporary release did not render the instant petition moot and academic because of the restrictions imposed by the respondents which constitute an involuntary and illegal restraint on his freedom.

Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot and academic in view of the detained person’s release with restrictions.

Held: No. Restraints attached to temporary release of a detained person warrant the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the nature of the involuntary restraint and relieving him of such restraints as may be illegal.

Reservation of the military in the form of restrictions attached to the detainee’s temporary release constitutes restraints on the liberty of the detainee. It is not physical restraint alone which is inquired into by the writ of habeas corpus.

Temporary release of detainee from detention with involuntary restraints does not render the petition for writ of habeas corpus moot and academic. It is available where a person continue to be unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where there is denial of due process, where the restraints are not merely involuntary but are necessary, and where a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later become arbitrary.

Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007

(Special Proceedings – Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of minors)

Facts: Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel, petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.

Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for their their 2 minor sons on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their education and deprived them of their mother’s care.

Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take custody of their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent.

The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was entitled to custody of the minors.

Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is lodged in the family courts under RA 8369.

Issue: WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving custody of minors.

Held: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court of Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court with family courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:

 Section 20.   Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

 x x x          x x x          x x x

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

In Re: Azucena L. Garcia, 339 SCRA 292, GR 141443, August 30, 2000

(Special Proceedings – Habeas Corpus: final judgment and bail)

Facts:  Petitioner is convicted by final judgment of the crime of falsification of public document. In the case at bar, petitioner is out on bail and is seeking for a relief via a petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of the judgment rendered. Petitioner contends that were proceedings were attended by violations of the constitutional rights of the accused; the judgment of conviction is void thereby warranting relief by the extraordinary legal remedy of habeas corpus.

The OSG, on the other hand states that the writ of habeas corpus is a remedy available to a person who is illegally imprisoned or restrained by his liberty. Consequently, a person discharged or out on bail, like petitioner, is not entitled to the writ.

Issue: WON a person convicted by final judgment and/or out on bail is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus.

Held: No. The high prerogative writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. Its object is to inquire into the legality of one’s detention, and if found illegal, to order release of the detainee.

It is a well-settled rule that the writ will not issue where the person in whose behalf the writ is sought is out on bail, or is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner, GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000; 332 SCRA 169

(Special Proceedings – Husband cannot be forced to live with his wife by Habeas Corpus)

Facts: Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband Potenciano alleging that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband.

The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration  but denied the petition for habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.

Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife.

Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation rights.

Issue: May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling.

Held: No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld  from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continuous unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.

The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal.

A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the subject of visitation rights against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.

No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne process.

Feria vs CA, GR No. 122954, February 15, 2000; 525 SCRA 525_digested

(Special Proceedings –Habeas Corpus)

Facts: After discovering that his entire criminal records, including the copy of the judgment, was lost or destroyed, petitioner filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the SC against the Jail Warden of the Manila City Jail, the Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional Trial Court of Manila, and the City Prosecutor of Manila, praying for his discharge from confinement on the ground that his continued detention without any valid judgment is illegal and violative of his constitutional right to due process.

The RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the mere loss of the records of the case does not invalidate the judgment or commitment nor authorize the release of the petitioner, and that the proper remedy would be reconstitution of the records of the case which should be filed with the court which rendered the decision.

Petitioner argues that his detention is illegal because there exists no copy of a valid judgment as required by Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and that the evidence considered by the trial court and Court of Appeals in the habeas corpus proceedings did not establish the contents of such judgment.

In a comment, OSG maintains that public respondents have more than sufficiently shown the existence of a legal ground for petitioner’s continued incarceration, viz., his conviction by final judgment, and under Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the discharge of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment is not authorized.

Issue: WON there is legal basis to detain petitioner after the destruction or loss of his criminal records.

Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus, was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. It secures to a prisoner the right to have the cause of his detention examined and determined by a court of justice, and to have the issue ascertained as to whether he is held under lawful authority. Consequently, the writ may also be availed of where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person, (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. Petitioner’s claim is anchored on the first ground considering, as he claims, that his continued detention, notwithstanding the lack of a copy of a valid judgment of conviction, is violative of his constitutional right to due process.Based on the records and the hearing conducted by the trial court, there is sufficient evidence on record to establish the fact of conviction of petitioner which serves as the legal basis for his detention.

As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondent rests on the petitioner who attacks such restraint. In other words, where the return is not subject to exception, that is, where it sets forth process which on its face shows good ground for the detention of the prisoner, it is incumbent on petitioner to allege and prove new matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effect of such process. If the detention of the prisoner is by reason of lawful public authority, the return is considered prima facie evidence of the validity of the restraint and the petitioner has the burden of proof to show that the restraint is illegal.

When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the party who is so charged, its judgment, order, or decree is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus.

Cruz vs. CA, G.R. No. 137560. January 19, 2000

(Special Proceedings – Habeas Corpus: Requisites)

Facts: Maria Cruz’s filed a petition for habeas corpus. Her son, David, was tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (RA 6425). He was convicted on September 27, 1993 and sentenced to life imprisonment. He was committed to the National Penitentiary on October 13, 1993. On December 31, 1993, R.A. No. 769 took effect. This law amended provisions of several penal laws, including the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

The penalty for the illegal sale of marijuana under the old law was “life imprisonment to death.” Under R.A. 7659, the penalty depended on the quantity of the drug. The sale of “750 grams or more of Indian hemp or marijuana” became punishable by reclusion perpetua, to death. The penalty for the sale of less than 750 grams of marijuana was reduced to a range “from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua, depending upon the quantity” of the drug.

The amount of marijuana for which David Cruz was convicted is 2.70 grams. The imposable penalty for this amount under the Simon ruling is prision correctional which has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Presently, David Cruz has already served six (6) years and three (3) months of his sentence which is way beyond the last day of prision correccional. The continued detention of Cruz at, the National Penitentiary has been admitted by the Solicitor General as already illegal.

Issue: WON a petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted.

Held: Yes. The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. An application for the writ of habeas corpus is made upon verified petition setting forth: (1) that the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; (2) the officer or name of the person by whom he is imprisoned or restrained; (3) the place where he is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; and (4) a copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person.