Santos, et al. vs. Aranzanso, et al., No. L-23828, February 28, 1966_digested

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent, Abandonment and Collateral Attack)

Facts: A petition for adoption of Paulina, 17 years old and Aurora Santos, 8 years old, was filed by Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes in the CFI of Manila. It was alleged that both parents of the minors have long been unheard from and could not be found in spite of diligent efforts to locate them; that since the war said minors have been abandoned; and that for years since their infancy, said children have been continuously been in petitioners’ care and custody. The consent to the adoption has been given by the guardian ad litem appointed by the Court. After due publication and hearing, the adoption court granted the petition for the adoption.

Subsequently – eight years later – Juliana Reyes died intestate. Simplicio Santos filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the former, stating among other things that the surviving heirs of the deceased are: he, Paulina Santos and Aurora Santos. He also asked that he be appointed administrator of the estate.

Gregoria Aranzanso, alleging to be the first cousin of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition for appointment of administrator, asserting among others that the adoption of Paulina and Aurora Santos is void ab initio for want of the written consent of their parents, who were then living and had not abandoned them.

Demetria Ventura, alleging likewise to be the first cousin of the deceased and mother of Paulina opposed also the petition of Simplicio and adopted the pleadings filed by Aranzanso.

The Court of Appeals sustained respondent-oppositors right to make a collateral attack against the adoption decree on the ground of failure to obtain the consent of the natural parents was a jurisdictional defect rendering the adoption void ab initio.

Issue: WON a decree of adoption could be assailed collaterally in a settlement proceeding.

Held: No. Firstly, consent of the parents is not an absolute requisite if child was abandoned, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices.

Second, in adoption proceedings, abandonment imports “any conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forgo all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.” It means neglect or refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of care and support which parents owe to their children.”

Third, the settled rule is that even when the jurisdiction of an inferior tribunal depends upon the existence of a fact to be established before it, the determination of that fact by the tribunal cannot be questioned in a collateral attack upon its order. Hence, the CA erred in reviewing under a collateral attack, the determination of the adoption court that the parents of the adopted children had abandoned them.

Reyes vs. Sotero, GR No. 167405, February 16, 2006_digested

(Special Proceedings – Adoption)

Facts: Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a grandniece of the deceased.

Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter’s husband and asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition attaching thereto the certification of her adoption from the local civil registrar’s office that the adoption decree was registered therein and also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac.

Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that reasonable doubts have been cast on Petitioner’s claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain “badges of fraud.”

The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before the trial court that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since, “imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.”

Issue: WON petitioner had to prove the validity of her adoption due to imputations of irregularities.

Held: No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial court.

An adoption decree is a public document required by law to be entered into public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrar’s office as well as the court which rendered the judgment.

Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner’s adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner’s adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere “imputations of irregularities” will not cast a “cloud of doubt” on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.

Republic vs. Miller, GR No. 125932, April 22, 1999

(Special Proceedings – Adoption by aliens, vested rights)

Facts: On July 29, 1988, Spouses Miller, both American citizens, filed with the RTC, Angeles City a verified petition to adopt a Filipino child under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allows aliens to adopt. The natural parents executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent to the adoption and the DSWD recommended approval of the petition on the basis of its evaluation.

On August 3, 1998, the Family Code became effective, prohibiting the adoption of a Filipino child by aliens.

The Solicitor General appealed to the granting of the petition for adoption by the RTC.

Issue: WON aliens may be allowed to adopt when the petition for adoption was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code prohibiting the same.

Held: Yes. An alien qualified to adopt under the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition, acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new law disqualifying him.

Vested right include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested.

 

Republic vs. Hernandez, GR No. 117209, February 9, 1996_digested

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Change of Name)

Facts: The RTC granted the petition for adoption of Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran and simultaneously granted the prayer therein for the change of the first name of said adoptee to Aaron Joseph, to complement the surname Munson y Andrade which he acquired consequent to his adoption.

Petitioner opposed the inclusion of the relief for change of name in the same petition for adoption objecting to the joinder of the petition for adoption and the petitions for the change of name in a single proceeding, arguing that these petition should be conducted and pursued as two separate proceedings.

Petitioner argues that a petition for adoption and a petition for change of name are two special proceedings which, in substance and purpose, are different from and are not related to each other, being respectively governed by distinct sets of law and rules. Petitioner further contends that what the law allows is the change of the surname of the adoptee, as a matter of right, to conform with that of the adopter and as a natural consequence of the adoption thus granted. If what is sought is the change of the registered given or proper name, and since this would involve a substantial change of one’s legal name, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 should accordingly be instituted, with the substantive and adjective requisites therefor being conformably satisfied.

Private respondents, on the contrary, admittedly filed the petition for adoption with a prayer for change of name predicated upon Section 5, Rule 2 which allows permissive joinder of causes of action in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and in line with the policy of discouraging protracted and vexatious litigations. It is argued that there is no prohibition in the Rules against the joinder of adoption and change of name being pleaded as two separate but related causes of action in a single petition.

Issue: WON respondent judge erred in granting prayer for the change of the given or proper name if the adoptee in a petition for adoption.

Held: No.

Par (1), Art. 189 of the Family Code provides one of the legal effect of adoption:

(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of the adopters;

The law allows the adoptee, as a matter of right and obligation, to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. It is the change of the adoptee’s surname to follow that of the adopter which is the natural and necessary consequence of a grant of adoption and must specifically be contained in the order of the court, in fact, even if not prayed for by petitioner.

However, the given or proper name, also known as the first or Christian name, of the adoptee must remain as it was originally registered in the civil register. The creation of an adoptive relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee’s registered Christian or first name. The automatic change thereof, premised solely upon the adoption thus granted, is beyond the purview of a decree of adoption. Neither is it a mere incident in nor an adjunct of an adoption proceeding, such that a prayer therefor furtively inserted in a petition for adoption, as in this case, cannot properly be granted.

The official name of a person whose birth is registered in the civil register is the name appearing therein. If a change in one’s name is desired, this can only be done by filing and strictly complying with the substantive and procedural requirements for a special proceeding for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, wherein the sufficiency of the reasons or grounds therefor can be threshed out and accordingly determined.

A petition for change of name being a proceeding in rem, strict compliance with all the requirements therefor is indispensable in order to vest the court with jurisdiction for its adjudication. It is an independent and discrete special proceeding, in and by itself, governed by its own set of rules. A fortiori, it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding. To consider it as a mere incident or an offshoot of another special proceeding would be to denigrate its role and significance as the appropriate remedy available under our remedial law system.

Perez vs. CA, GR No. 118870, March 29, 1996

(Special Proceedings – Custody: A child under seven years shall not be separated from his mother)

Facts: Respondent father, a doctor of medicine and petitioner mother, a registered nurse working in the US are married couples who are separated in fact with only one child.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus asking respondent to surrender the custody of their son. The RTC issued an Order awarding custody of the one-year old child to his mother, citing the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code.

Upon appeal by the father, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order and awarded custody of the boy to him ruling that there were enough reasons to deny petitioner custody over the child even under seven years old. It held that granting custody to the boy’s father would be for the child’s best interest and welfare.

Article 213, par 2, provides in case of separation of parents that no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.

Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court also states that “No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds there are compelling reasons therefore.

Issue: WON custody of the child is to be given to the father.

Held:  No. The provisions of the law clearly mandate that a child under seven years of age shall not be separated from his mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. The use of the word “shall” in Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99, Sec 6 of the Revised Rules of Court connotes a mandatory character.

Couples who are separated in fact are covered within the term separation.

The Family Code in reverting to the provision of the Civil Code that a child below seven years old shall not be separated from the mother (Article 363), has expressly repealed the earlier Article 17, par 3 of the Child and youth Welfare Code which reduced the child’s age to 5 years.

Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested

(Special Proceedings – Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the former’s brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.

A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptee’s biological mother.

Held:  No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.

The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

Chin Ah Foo and Yee Shee vs. Concepcion and Lee Voo, No. 33281, March 31, 1930, digested

(Special Proceedings – Insane persons; discharge from custody; respective powers of Trial Judge and Director of Health; Art. 8, Penal Code and Sec. 1048 , Administrative Code)

Facts: A Judge of the Court of first Instance acquitted a man charged with murder on the plea of insanity, and has ordered the confinement of the insane person in an asylum, subsequently permitting the same to leave the asylum without the acquiescence of the Director of Health.

Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Penal Code discloses that the permission of the court who orders the confinement of one accused of a grave felony in an insane asylum is a prerequisite for obtaining release from the institution by the Director of Health.

Section 1048 of the Administrative Code grants the Director of Health authority to say when a patient may be discharged from an insane asylum.

Article 8 of the Penal Code has not been impliedly repealed by section 1048 of the Administrative Code.

Issue: WON a judge who ordered the confinement of an insane person in an asylum may permit the same to leave the asylum without the opinion of the Director of Health.

Held: No. Article 8 of the Penal Code and section 1048 of the Administrative Code can be construed so that both can stand together in such a way that the powers of the courts and of the Director of Health are complimentary to each other.

The Director of Health is without power to release, without proper judicial authority, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum pursuant to the provisions of Article 8 of the Penal Code. Conversely, any person confined by order of the court in an asylum in accordance with article 8 of the Penal Code cannot be discharged from custody until the views of the Director of Health have been ascertained as to whether or not the person is temporarily of permanently cured or may be released without danger.

 

 

Manuel Barredo vs Court of Appeals, GR No. L-17863, November 28, 1962, digested

(Special Proceedings – Claims against estate; Rule 86, Sec. 2: Statute of Non-Claims)

Facts: On 23 and 30 August and 6 September 1945, a notice to creditors requiring them their claims with the clerk of court previously fixed within 6 months reckoned from the date of its first publication and expiring February 23, 1946, was published by the administrator of the intestate estate of Charles McDonough.

On 22 October 1947, the heirs of Fausto Barredo filed their belated claim to collect the face value of a promissory note for P20,000.00 plus interest and attorney’s fees against the said estate. The promissory note was secured by a mortgage in favor of Fausto Barredo over the leasehold rights of McDnough The original lease, the extension of its term, and the mortgage were all annotated at the back of the certificate of title of the land. A deed of extrajudicial partition of the secured credit was also made by the heirs and was annotated at the back of the aforesaid title.

The claim was opposed by the administrator. The lower court allowed it after hearing, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals.

In the case at bar, petitioner contends that the one month period referred to in Section 2 of Rule 87 of Rules of Court is to be counted from and after the expiration of the 6 month period fixed in the published notice to claims. The respondent administrator argues that the one-month period for filing late claims should be counted from the expiration of the regular 6-month period.

Section 2, Rule 87 provides:

SEC. 2. Time within which claims shall be filed. — In the notice provided in section 1, the court shall state the time for the filing of claims against the estate, which shall not be more than twelve nor less than six months after the date of the first publication of the notice. However, at any time before an order of distribution is entered, on application of a creditor who has failed to file his claim within the time previously limited, the court may, for cause shown and on such terms as are equitable, allow such claim to be filed within a time not exceeding one month.

Issue: WON the tardy claim will be allowed.

Held: No. The claim was filed outside of the period previously fixed with an insufficient cause. A tardy claim may be allowed, at the discretion of the court, upon showing of cause for failure to present said claim on time.

The one-month period specified in this section is the time granted claimants, and the same is to begin from the order authorizing the filing of the claims. It does not mean that the extension of one month starts from the expiration of the original period fixed by the court for the presentation of claims. (Paulin vs. Aquino, L-11267, March 20, 1958)

However, the probate court’s discretion in allowing a claim after the regular period for filing claims but before entry of an order of distribution presupposes not only claim for apparent merit but also that cause existed to justify the tardiness in filing the claim. Here, petitioners alleged as excuse for their tardiness the recent recovery of the papers of the late Fausto Barredo from the possession of his lawyer who is now deceased. This ground insufficient, due to the availability, and knowledge by the petitioners, of the annotation at the back of the certificate of title of the mortgage embodying the instant claim, (as well as the payment of P20,000.00 made by the Japanese military authorities.)

The order of the trial court allowing the late claim without justification, because under Section 2, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, said court has no authority to admit a belated claim for no cause or for an insufficient cause.

Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449, digested

(Special Proceedings – Difference between Preterition and Disinheritance)

Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line – were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue:  WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the compulsory heirs.

Held: Yes.  Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner, by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.