OCAMPO VS. HRET, super digested

432 SCRA 145, June 15 2004 (Constitutional Law – Disqualification)

FACTS: In the case at bar, private respondent, a duly elected congressman, was declared disqualified 22 months after the May 14, 2001 elections. Petitioner avers that, having garnered the second highest number of votes, the same should be declared the winner in the said elections.

ISSUE: Whether or not a second placer in congressional elections can be proclaimed the duly elected Congressman.

HELD: No, it is settled jurisprudence that the subsequent disqualification of a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner. The latter could not be proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among the qualified candidates.

 

Note: Voters are not afforded the opportunity of electing a ‘substitute congressman’ in the eventuality that their first choice dies, resigns, is disqualified, or in any other way leaves the post vacant.  There can only be one representative for that particular legislative district.  There are no runners-up or second placers.  Thus, when the person vested with the mandate of the majority is disqualified from holding the post he was elected to, the only recourse to ascertain the new choice of the electorate is to hold another election.

Victoria vs. Comelec [299 SCRA 269]

(Local Government, Succession, Ranking in the Sanggunian)

Facts: Under the LGC, the position of vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sanggunian member, and for purposes of succession, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters  in each district.

In the Elections, petitioner candidate Victoria from the 2^nd district garnered 32, 918 votes and respondent candidate Calisin from the 1^st district garnered 28, 335 votes.

The COMELEC issued a resolution certifying respondent as 1^st in the order of ranking with petitioner as 2^nd ranking member pursuant to the provisions above.

Petitioner claims that the ranking should not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district who actually voted therein.

Issue: Whether or not the proportion of the the votes obtained to the number of registered voters of each district shall be factored to the number of voters who actually voted in determining the ranking in the Sanggunian.

Held: No. The law is clear that the ranking in the Sangguninan shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters of each district.

COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top 3:

 

District            Registered Voters        Votes Obtained           Percent            Rank

Calisin             1^st                    130,085                       28,335                         21.78               1^st

Victoria           2^nd                    155.318                       32,918                         21.19               2^nd

Marcellana       2^nd                    155.318                       26,030                         16.76               3rd

Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002

(Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit)  

Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa, and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.

Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.

COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election.

Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:

“Section 8.  The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.  Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which provides:

 “Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b)  No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms.  The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule.  The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term.  The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term.  Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons.  First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three consecutive terms.  Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms.  The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term.  A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other subsequent election involving the same term of office.  What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001.  The immediate re-election that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.

Papandayan, Jr. vs COMELEC [381 SCRA 133]

(Municipal Corporation, Qualification of Elective Officials, Residence)

Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought the disqualification of petitioner alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.

Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he managed an agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he filed in 1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdraw.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified in a resolution, on the ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective official.

Held: No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of Bayang, he later transferred residence to Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.

Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective official must be a “…resident therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election…”

Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used in election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, couple with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.

Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

Navarro and Tamayo vs CA [GR 141307; March 28, 2001]

(Local Government, Permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian, Section 45 (b) of the Local Government Code)

Facts: With the death of the Mayor Calimlim, a vacancy was created in the Office of the Mayor so by operation of law, he was succeeded by Aquino the then Vice-Mayor. Petitioner Tamayo, the  highest ranking member of the Sangguniang Bayan was elevated to the position of the Vice Mayor pursuant to the same law.

Since vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the elevation of the petitioner, Governor Agbayani appointed herein petitioner Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang Bayan.

Aquino belonged to the political party Lakas NUCD-KAMPI, while both Navarro and Tamayo belonged to REFORMA-LM political party.

Private respondents seek to nullify the appointment of petitioner Navarro arguing that it was the former vice-mayor, succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the permament vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because under the law he was also a member of the Sanggunian. Thus, the appointee must come from said former vice-mayor’s political party.

Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who was the highest ranking member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the Vice-Mayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy. The person to be appointed to the position vacated by him should come from the same political party affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo.

However, the CA concluded that it was the appointment of the 8^th councilor, to the number 7 position which created the last vacancy; therefore, the person to be appointed to the vacant position should come from the same political party to which the latter belonged, which was Lakas-NUCD KAMPI.

Issue: WON the elevation of the highest ranking member of the Sanggunian to the position of vice-mayor created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan.

Held: Yes. Under Sec 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.

Sec 45 (b) of the same law provides that “…only the nominee of the political party under which the Sanggunian member concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner herein provided. The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy…”

The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as willed by the people in the election.

With the elevation of the petitioner, who belonged to REFORMA-LM, to the position of vice-mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that whould be filled up with someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LM’s representation would be diminished.

Mercado vs Manzano [307 SCRA 630]

(Municipal Corporation, Local Government Code)

Facts: Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati.

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution, dated May 7, 1998, granting the petition and ordered the cancellation of the COC of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen.

Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. The motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Private respondent opposed contending that at the time of the Elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

Issue: WON petitioner who intervened prior proclamation will hold the elective office of the Vice-Mayor when respondent is disqualified.

Held: Yes. Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is “a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City who cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.”

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent.  The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time.  Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene.  The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner.  In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File Intervention” on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified “from running for an elective local position” under par 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160.

Magtajas vs Pryce Properties, Inc. [234 SCRA 255]

(Municipal Corporation –  Tests of a Valid Ordinance)

Facts: The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government.

PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City by leasing a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc. for its casino.

On December 7, 1992, Sangguniang Panlungsod of CDO enacted ordinance 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of a casino.

On January 4, 1993, it enacted Ordinance 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for violation therefore.

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the CA, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor.

The Court found the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. CDO City and its mayor filed a petition for review under Rules of Court with the Supreme Court.

Issue: WON the Sangguniang Panlungsod can prohibit the establishment of casino operated by PAGCOR through an ordinance or resolution.

Held: No. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. In the exercise of its own discretion, the Congress may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.

Under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, “gambling and other prohibited games of chance.”

Ordinances should not contravene a statue as municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

6) It must not be unreasonable.

 

Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602]

(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)

Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.

The COMELEC found that Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition for disqualification

Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.

The private respondent maintains that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issue: WON petitioner’s  assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, “the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: “No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.”

The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC, [176 SCRA 1; GR 86564, August 1, 1989]

(Municipal Corporation, Qualification, 2^nd Highest Number of Votes)

Facts: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of Baguio City during Elections. Having garnered the highest number of votes, Petitioner was elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the second highest number of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto contesting the election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a naturalized Australian citizen and was divested of his Philippine citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner opposes to the contrary.

Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines.

From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not possessed by the petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.

Issue: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2^nd highest number of votes, can replace the petitioner as mayor.

Held: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.

 

Note:

1. Dual citizenship is not a bar in running for elections, dual allegiance is.
2. Mere repatriation is not enough to run for elections.
3. A written certification of an oath of allegiance to the Philippines must be attached together with the COC.

 

 

Ramon Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC [211 SCRA 297;GR 105111, July 3, 1992]

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, 2^nd Highest Number of Votes)

Facts: For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed his COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.

On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.

On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.

On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections.

Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already become final and executory.

Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.

Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy —

(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. WON Petitioner Labo who had the highest number of votes is qualified to assume as Mayor of Baguio City.
2. WON disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio City.

Held:

First Issue:

No. At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition on May 15, 1992, the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo’s) certificate of candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992, said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this Court.

The resolution cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains the SC to rule against his proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.

Sec. 39 of the LGC provides that an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective office. The fact that he was elected by the majority of the electorate is of no moment.

Second Issue:

No. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect.

Petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner’s (Labo’s) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).

The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

 

Note: It’s useless to file for disqualification when the decision comes out after the election.